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From March to July of 2007, the DARPA Orbital Express mission achieved a 
number of firsts in autonomous spacecraft operations.  The NASA Advanced Video 
Guidance Sensor (AVGS) was the primary docking sensor during the first two 
dockings and was used in a blended mode three other automated captures.  The 
AVGS performance exceeded its specification by approximately an order of 
magnitude.  One reason that the AVGS functioned so well during the mission was 
that the validation and calibration of the sensor prior to the mission advanced the 
state-of-the-art for proximity sensors.  Some factors in this success were 
improvements in ground test equipment and truth data, the capability for ILOAD 
corrections for optical and other effects, and the development of a bias correction 
procedure.  Several valuable lessons learned have applications to future proximity 
sensors. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ASA supplied the Advanced Video Guidance Sensor (AVGS) to DARPA and prime contractor 
Boeing as part of the Orbital Express mission that flew in March of 2007.  The Orbital Express 
mission was a demonstration of automated satellite servicing.  Orbital Express accomplished several firsts 
in automated spaceflight, including the first successful automated American propellant transfer, the first 
automated transfer of batteries, the first automated transfer CPU transfer, and the first American Automated 
Rendezvous and Capture (AR&C).  The AVGS was a critical component for the AR&C operations.  
Boeing built and supplied the chase vehicle, called ASTRO, while Ball Aerospace provided the NEXTSat 
target vehicle.  
 
The AVGS Sensor is a combination of video and lasers that uses corner cube retro-reflectors on the target 
vehicle.  The lasers are fired at two different wavelengths.  One laser wavelength is filtered by a lens on the 
reflectors.  The different-frequency lasers are fired asynchronously at 5 Hz each, with an offset of 0.1 
second.  The sensor stores the alternating images at 10 Hz internally.  One 10 Hz image thus contains all 
background lighting plus the corner-cube reflections, while the next 10 Hz image has the background 
lighting and no corner-cube reflections.  These images are subtracted, and spots from the corner-cube 
reflectors are readily visible in the resulting image with little or no noise spots.  This method of locating the 
retro-reflectors is highly robust to a variety of on-orbit lighting conditions.  
 
For the Orbital Express mission, the AVGS used four smaller corner-cubes for the Short Range Target 
(SRT), and four larger corner-cubes for a Long Range Target (LRT).  Both of these target configurations 
are displayed conceptually in Figure 1.  Once the target assemblies are captured in the imager by the 
“background-subtraction” process described above, the “Inverse Perspective” algorithm processes the 2-D 
                                                          
1 Aerospace Engineer, Guidance, Navigation and Control Group, EV42, NASA Marshall Space Flight 
Center, Huntsville, AL 35812,  andrew.f.heaton@nasa.gov, AIAA Member, AAS Member. 
2 Team Leader, Advanced Vehicle Sensors Team, NASA MSFC, Huntsville, AL 35812 / ES62, non-
member. 
3 Aerospace Engineer, Guidance Navigation and Mission Analysis, NASA MSFC AL 35812 / EV42, non-
member. 
N
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090001904 2019-08-30T05:54:47+00:00Z
reflector image into a full 6-DOF attitude and range solution.  The Inverse Perspective combines the spot 
data as input with the known locations of the corner-cubes on the target spacecraft to determine the 
solution.   
 
 
 
Figure 1) AVGS Corner-Cube Locations on NEXTSat 
 
The AVGS has a long history of development and previous flight validation.  AVGS flew on the 
Demonstration of Automated Rendezvous Technology (DART) in 2005.  Although the mission 
experienced an anomaly and did not achieve the phase where AVGS was used in closed-loop fashion, 
valuable bearing data was collected in the AVGS “spot mode”, and the AVGS performance was nominal.  
Prior to DART, an earlier model of the AVGS known as the Video Guidance Sensor (VGS) flew two open-
loop experiments on the shuttle flights STS-87 and STS-95 (in 1997 and 1998 respectively).  NASA 
developed the original concept and Engineering Development Unit (EDU) of the VGS in 1992, so the 
highly successful flight on Orbital Express is the result of 15 years of development.  This is a timeframe 
commensurate with the development of the recent highly successful flight of the ESA Videometer on the 
ESA Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV).  The Videometer uses a technological approach similar to the 
VGS that flew on STS-87 and STS-95 
 
Table 1) Orbital Express AVGS Specification 
 
Target Operating 
Range      
(m) 
Range 
(mm) 
Azimuth, 
Elevation 
(deg) 
Roll 
(deg) 
Pitch, 
Yaw 
(deg) 
SRT 1-3 +12 +0.033 +0.13 +0.20 
SRT >3-5 +35 +0.033 +0.25 +0.33 
SRT >5-10 +150 +0.035 +0.45 +0.70 
SRT >10-30 
(S )
+1500 +0.037 +1.30 +2.0 
LRT >10-30 
( )
+150 +0.027 +0.15 +0.70 
LRT >30-50 +400 +0.030 +0.25 +1.2 
LRT >50-100 +1666 +0.033 +0.50 +2.4 
LRT >100-300 +15,000 +0.035 +1.40 +7.0 
 
Automated Rendezvous and Capture (AR&C) requires a relatively tight error budget for a proximity 
sensor.  A manned spacecraft can react more quickly to unplanned contingencies and 3-sigma error 
dispersions.  Therefore, a manned docking typically requires less stringent sensor accuracy.  Thus, for 
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automated operations it becomes more important to calibrate the sensor and validate that it meets 
specification.  Calibration and validation should be accomplished prior to flight on the ground, but the 
ability to adjust calibration on-orbit is also very valuable.  For Orbital Express, the AVGS had a 
challenging specification (see Table 1). 
 
PROXIMITY SENSOR ERROR SOURCES 
 
Several factors affect proximity sensor performance.  There is the “absolute accuracy” of the sensor itself, 
which can be affected by many internal characteristics of the sensor and/or any target it might use.  These 
can be classified as “internal errors” and will vary from sensor to sensor.  Error can also be introduced from 
external sources, of which there are two broad categories.  The first category is misalignment (which 
includes the sensor and the target on the target spacecraft, if one is used).  The second category is 
environmental factors that might affect performance such as lighting or thermal stresses.  The effect of the 
environmental factors can vary from degraded performance to loss of signal. 
 
The accuracy of the sensor can be tested extensively on the ground, in most cases.  Some allowance must 
be made to account for vacuum conditions and orbital lighting.  In our experience, the vacuum effect, while 
noticeable, does not appreciably affect performance for visual proximity sensors and so ground testing to 
validate truth can proceed with confidence (the presence of a vacuum is typically to improve, not degrade 
performance).  Effective ground testing for validation of sensor accuracy is most strongly affected by the 
accuracy of the truth estimate used as a basis for comparison.  While several factors affect truth validation, 
for AVGS, we found the biggest factors to be optics and test equipment 
 
Misalignments can be corrected after the fact.  That is, once the vehicles are docked, a bias can be 
estimated and removed via a software ILOAD procedure.  (An ILOAD in this case is a text file that allows 
software parameters to be easily updated through a simple process that does not require recompiling code).  
The AVGS team on Orbital Express was fortunate in that the vehicles were launched in the mated position, 
and that the docking mechanism had a high degree of repeatability.  Thus, we were able to execute a highly 
accurate bias calibration procedure in October of 2006, when the vehicles were mated in the clean room in 
Titusville.  This will not be the case for every mission, but experience on Orbital Express suggests that a 
bias calibration procedure is possible for vehicles that dock for the first time on-orbit. 
 
As for lighting, in the case of the AVGS it typically does not directly degrade the performance of the sensor 
itself, but can in some cases limit the operational envelope of the sensor.  We say this not in the sense that 
the operational envelope is severely restricted (some proximity sensors require very tight lighting 
constraints in order to work), but in the sense that it might degrade the maximum range or lead to 
occasional dropouts at some of the longer ranges.  The AVGS is designed to be (and is) very robust to on-
orbit lighting conditions, and yet some problems were still encountered (in spite of a successful spaceflight 
of the sensor and two spaceflights of its predecessor the VGS).  In fact, it’s not a stretch to say that lighting 
is by far the biggest space environmental effect on vision-based proximity sensors.  In the case of the 
AVGS some minor problems were encountered with lighting that can be attributed primarily to target 
design and secondarily to lens optics.  Needless to say, very valuable lessons were learned in this area. 
 
Thermal stress can also affect sensor performance by direct effects on the sensor and thermal bending that 
might affect sensor and target location.  Thermal bending did not appear to be an issue for the AVGS on 
Orbital Express.  It’s possible that some future mission might have a target or sensor mounted in a location 
or in an environment where this would be a concern, but in the four flights to date of the AVGS and VGS, 
this has never been an issue.  What thermal stress did affect on Orbital Express was the low-frequency 
noise signature of the AVGS, which was directly correlated with temperature variations in the sensor.  
While this characteristic may be specific to AVGS and so not applicable to future sensors, it did constitute 
by far the largest source of noise for the AVGS (though still well below specification) and so is important. 
 
Finally, if a proximity sensor does use a target (the AVGS and the three Boeing camera-based sensors on 
Orbital Express all used a target), then the target design can greatly affect sensor performance.  This was a 
very valuable lesson for the AVGS team on Orbital Express that re-enforced existing notions on target 
design and also provided fresh insight, to the point that we feel justified in saying proximity sensor target 
design is now a science and not an art.   
 
SENSOR VALIDATION TESTING 
 
For AVGS ground testing, the emphasis of ground testing is typically hardware-related issues in the earlier 
phases of the program.  For example, in the early stages there is a good deal of “Optical Characterization 
Testing” (OCT).  OCT tests determine the proper settings (laser power, video chip integration time and 
video chip threshold) to allow the AVGS to image target spots at all operational ranges.  Other tests might 
be performed to correct hardware issues, determine the boresight and/or focal length of the sensor, and so 
forth.  During the later phases of a flight program, the test emphasis switches to validation of the 
performance specification.  Accurate truth data for comparison is a key element of this test.  This paper is 
primarily concerned with the tests that are directly related to validating the accuracy of the sensor. 
 
In the past, the specification for the VGS and AVGS was more forgiving than the OE specification that 
appears in Table 1.  The OE specification was derived directly from the DART specification as it existed in 
March of 2003, at the very beginning of NASA’s Orbital Express effort.  Unfortunately, the DART 
specification was developed prior to DART flight unit testing and proved to be optimistic.  NASA relaxed 
the DART specification in fall of 2003, and recommended to Boeing and DARPA that the Orbital Express 
adopt the new standard.  Boeing insisted that the original specification be honored, and so a more rigorous 
approach to truth validation was needed for OE than that required for DART. 
 
More accurate truth data was possible for Orbital Express due to two advances in test equipment.  First, the 
Flight Robotics Laboratory (FRL) at the Marshall Space Flight Center was able to purchase a Leica laser-
range finder to produce accurate truth estimates for the ground testing.  The Leica is a device that can 
measure several points on the AVGS sensor and the AVGS target and provide a range and pose estimate 
that is independent of the sensor itself.  The user is even able to define different coordinate frames in which 
to take the measurement, which allows easily identifiable features on the sensor or target to be used for 
reference.  We used a variety of reference points on the target and sensor for the tests, but for the Systems 
Performance Test in October of 2005, the reference points were the back plate of the AVGS sensor and the 
top of the glass for the offset corner cube on the SRT target.   
 
Boeing also supplied NASA a test platform for short range testing called the Newmark.  The Newmark 
consists of a pair of gimbaled test platforms that allow relative translation and rotation of the sensor and 
target with respect to each other in a tightly controlled environment.  The Newmark functioned out to a 
range of about 55 meters, and was highly effective in the close-range calibration testing of the sensor.  
Specifically, the Newmark enabled tight control of the relative rotation target with respect to the sensor to a 
precision of 0.01 degrees.  The target platform can rotate by command to any attitude within the operational 
constraints of the AVGS, and the commands can be automated with a script.  The sensor platform was used 
to change the bearing of the target with respect to the sensor, and can also be rotated to within 0.01 degrees 
and commanded manually or with a script.  
 
The Newmark was most useful at a relative range of less than 10 meters, where the SRT is required to 
function alone (the LRT is only required to Track to 10 meters).  The most important testing position for 
the AVGS was the docked or mated position.  On-orbit, the mated configuration of the vehicles was such 
that the AVGS was 1.219 meters from the SRT fixture.  Pre-mission, this range was not always known, and 
so the “mated position” tests varied from 1.1 to 1.5 meters over the course of the project.  However, in the 
long run, this was helpful, as the large number of tests performed between 1.1 and 1.5 meters helped to 
rigorously characterize the behavior of the AVGS in the capture envelope.  Capture envelope performance 
was the most critical operation for the AVGS on-orbit. 
 
The AVGS solution consists of Range, Azimuth, Elevation and a quaternion for the attitude.  For testing, 
the attitude is typically translated into Euler angles for ease of analysis, since the specification is written in 
Euler angles (however, the quaternion is passed to the navigation filter on-orbit).  Figure 2 illustrates the 
AVGS coordinate frame.  Figure 2 shows a sample SRT image in the Field of View, which is eight deg by 
eight deg.  Azimuth and Elevation are bearing angles defined as “positive-right” and “positive-up”, 
respectively, while Roll, Pitch, and Yaw are Euler rotations about the X, Y and Z axes of the AVGS 
reference frame, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 2) AVGS Coordinate Frame  
 
SYSTEMS PEFORMANCE TEST  
 
The Systems Performance Test (SPT) in October of 2005 was the primary source of accuracy validation for 
the AVGS sensor.  The tests consisted of a series of 2-minute tests at ranges of 28, 11, 5, 1.5 and 1.3 
meters.   (Two minutes was thought to allow sufficient variation for the typical AVGS noise characteristics 
at the time the test was designed).  Note that the “docked range” did not quite correspond to the actual 
docking range of 1.219 meters, because the location was not known precisely when the Systems 
Performance Test took place.  In addition to testing at a number of ranges (of which the 1.5 and 1.3 meter 
tests were most critical), the Newmark test apparatus was also used to vary the target attitude (Pitch, Yaw 
and Roll) and sensor bearing angle (Azimuth and Elevation) through a series of 2-minute tests to 
thoroughly characterize the AVGS performance over the entire operational envelope.   
 
Although the operational envelope of the AVGS extended to 120 meters, and the sensor was considered 
critical at ranges less than 60 meters, less rigorous ground testing was required outside of 30 meters.  The 
less stringent approach was possible for two reasons.  One, the specification at ranges greater than 30 
meters is rather forgiving.  Two, the Boeing sensors provided adequate overlap with the AVGS outside of 
30 meters, for the given specification.  Taking these factors into account, the testing for ranges greater than 
30 meters did not need to be as rigorous.  Here we will note that the AVGS was not tested at any range over 
100 meters, even though technically the specification extended to 300 meters.  Testing outside of 100 
meters was not considered necessary by the customer (though greatly desired by NASA) because 
operationally AVGS was only required inside of 120 meters.  (However, on the second unmated operation, 
Scenario 3-1, the AVGS was used as the primary sensor from 150 meters to dock and performed well, in 
spite of not having any OCT data for calibration at ranges greater than 100 meters).  Since the most critical 
area that received attention pre-mission was the close proximity ranges, including and particularly the 
capture envelope range (anything less than 1.5 meters), this paper focuses primarily on the close-range 
testing (30 meters and less). 
 
Azimuth 
Elevation 
Y, Pitch 
X, Roll 
Z, Yaw 
The attitude of the target and the bearing angle of the sensor were varied systematically for each of the 
ranges tested in the Systems Performance Test.  Each parameter of the solution was tested over its 
operational range inside of 60 meters.  The operational range for the Azimuth and Elevation was +/-4 
degrees (based on the size of the ASTRO approach corridor).  The operational range for the target Pitch, 
Yaw and Roll was also +/-4 degrees (based on the 3-sigma accuracy requirement on the NEXTSat attitude 
accuracy).  Also at each test range, the range was also varied slightly using the Newmark precision 
translational capability (+/- 1 cm in the X direction, with a precision of 1 mm).   
 
At each test range, each parameter was varied systemically.  For instance, at a range of 1.3 meters, the 
sensor was rotated to Azimuths of 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3 and -4 with no other rotations or translations.  
Then this test pattern was repeated five times while varying one of the other parameters at each test 
Azimuth at a time.  So at each test Azimuth, Pitch was varied, then reset to zero while Yaw was varied, and 
so forth.  In all, at the 1.3-meter range 73 individual two-minute tests were performed while for the entire 
test, roughly 360 individual two-minute tests were performed.  Some special manual testing also occurred 
at the end of the test phase to address particular problems.   
 
Several lessons were learned in the course of the SPT that greatly enhanced the ability to determine and 
fine-tune the accuracy of the AVGS.  One aspect explored in detail was the effect of the optical centers of 
the corner-cubes and sensor on the test, and how to compensate for inaccuracies or uncertainties in 
knowledge of their location.  For the SPT, the test philosophy mandated by Boeing (Dean Hallmark and 
Jerry LeCroy of Boeing designed and executed the SPT) was to use easily identifiable physical marks on 
the target and sensor for truth measurements.  These locations were then carefully adjusted to the optical 
centers of the corner cubes and sensor in post-test analysis.  The test reference mark for the sensor was the 
backplate and the reference mark for the target was the top of the glass of SRT #4 (see Figure 1).  Given 
this approach, knowledge of the location of the optical centers of both target and sensor was critical to 
accurate truth measurements. 
 
The optical center of the sensor was known with a high degree of accuracy from previous testing.  The 
optical center of the sensor was determined by Orbital Sciences Corporation, manufacturer of the sensor.  
This measurement was validated by earlier testing and considered to be known with an accuracy of +/- 
1mm per axis.  The Newmark test apparatus for the sensor was actually designed to rotate around the 
optical center of the sensor, and the uncertainty in the Newmark rotation was also on the order of +/ 1mm.  
Therefore the overall uncertainty of the optical center of the AVGS was known to about +/- 1.4 mm Root 
Mean Square (RMS), 1-sigma.  As it turned out, even this small uncertainty had to be considered in the 
SPT data analysis. 
 
The optical center of the corner cubes was not part of the specification from the manufacturer.  That is, it 
was not known a priori and had to be determined via testing.  Although some idea had been gleaned from 
earlier, less rigorous tests, the knowledge was much less precise than for the sensor.  Furthermore, the SRT 
and LRT corner cubes are different sizes, meaning each has a different optical center.  Knowledge of each 
was roughly on the order of +/- 5 mm prior to the SPT.   
 
A lack of knowledge of the optical center of the corner cubes (and to a lesser extent, of the sensor) 
contributes directly to errors in Range, Azimuth, and Elevation, since the center directly affects each of 
those parameters.  There is also an indirect effect on Pitch, Yaw and Roll, that is roughly proportionate to 
the Azimuth and Elevation errors.  The uncertainty in optical center presented some special issues for 
testing using the Newmark test apparatus.  Although the Newmark was very precise, an induced error can 
occur in test data when the target or sensor is not rotated about its respective optical center.   
 
This effect is best described using the illustration in Figure 3.  If the target is rotated about the exact optical 
center of corner cube SRT #4 (which is the overall reference point for the sensor solution), then the 
expected position of the target should match the center.  If however, the target is rotated about a point other 
than the optical sensor, a translation error is introduced into the “truth position”.  In this idealized example, 
the error would be in Azimuth, which would couple into a Yaw error as well.  In the real case, the error is 
actually cross-coupled in the full translational 3 DOF of the optical sensor, and those misalignments are 
then coupled with the rest of the solution.  However, since in the SPT only one other parameter at a time 
was varied with the main parameter being tested, it was possible to determine the optical center of the 
target corner cubes from experiment data, and adjust the data a posteriori.   That is to say, in the portion of 
the test that featured the Azimuth at 1.3 meters, the other parameters could largely be ignored and a 
calibration based on just Azimuth could be achieved.  As it turns out, only Azimuth and Elevation exceeded 
specification in the original testing, and it was eventually determined that the problem was largely due to 
rotation of the target assembly about a point other than its optical center, and to a lesser extent, some 
residual error in the location of the sensor optical center. 
 
 
 
Figure 3) Test Error Induced From Test Apparatus 
 
The problem of rotating about a point other than the optical center was known from earlier tests, and had 
previously been corrected, but the SPT needed a resolution of accuracy roughly an order of magnitude 
higher.  In the previous tests, a rough estimate of the optical center sufficed, but for the SPT it had to be 
estimated to within +/- 1 mm for both sensor and target.  The sensor optical center knowledge was already 
close to the needed accuracy, but an iterative effort was required to achieve sufficient knowledge of the 
optical center of the corner cube retro-reflectors.  
 
Briefly, the procedure for correcting for the optical center of the corner cubes consists of two steps.  The 
first step is to take the expressions that represent the known corner-cube locations in the AVGS flight 
software and vary them systematically in an independent simulation until an estimate of the corner-cube 
and sensor optical centers is found that adjusts the test data to be within specification.  This adjustment is 
then applied to a full simulation of the actual flight software using the raw spot centroids locations fed back 
in as raw data, to verify the solution.  What we found was that the independent simulation required several 
iterations but once it converged to a proper optical center for the target and sensor, the full simulation 
would match the result of the independent simulation.   
 
An example of the correction process appears in Table 2.  Some selected Azimuth data is shown from the 
original SPT test at 1.3 meters.  The errors before and after the optical center correction are shown, and the 
improvement brings the sensor to within specification.  
 
Table 2) Azimuth Errors with Optical Center Correction 
 
Test Azimuth Original Error Corrected Error 
2 -0.1097 0.0150 
1 -0.0675 0.0006 
-1 -0.0428 -0.0007 
-2 -0.0284 -0.0138 
 
In addition to the advantage of achieving flight certification, the process developed produced two ancillary 
benefits as well.  Specifically, it enabled us to estimate the optical center of the SRT corner cubes to 
approximately 1 mm.  This was beneficial to the overall performance of the sensor at all ranges, since this 
Sensor Target  
Optical center rotation 
Off-optical center rotation 
Induced bearing error 
reference point was used by the ASTRO flight software to transform the AVGS solution (which is sensor-
to-target) into the ASTRO body coordinate reference frame with a high degree of accuracy.  The second 
ancillary benefit is that we developed the second simulation described above, which essentially consisted of 
the actual flight software taking recorded spot data as input (as opposed to actual digital measurements) and 
this simulation proved very useful for many other forms of data analysis. 
 
Although it was important and led to ancillary benefits, the optical center correction was only part of the 
SPT data calibration process.  We also had to develop a process to correct for fixed sensor biases, since 
these could in theory exceed the specification (the optical sensor correction essentially was absorbed by this 
later process).  Some discussion of the specification is necessary.  The specification was written as a total 
error specification.  During the DART mission, the specification was eventually adapted to one that 
included a bias and noise specification, which is typical of most navigation sensors.   However, due to the 
Boeing insistence that we honor the original DART specification, we were unable to adjust the OE 
specification in a similar manner.  Furthermore, Boeing desired that we design the sensor I-LOAD so that a 
fixed bias from all error sources could be removed.  That is, in addition to the bias induced by the internal 
error of the sensor, it was also highly desired that any mounting misalignments of the sensor or target be 
correctable via an I-LOAD procedure (an I-LOAD is a writable portion of the flight software that contains 
constants and calibration data that can be replaced if necessary during the mission without modifying the 
actual flight software.)   Therefore, we were tasked by the customer to develop a “Bias Calibration 
Procedure”. 
 
BIAS CALIBRATION PROCEDURE  
 
In order to fully develop a bias calibration procedure, we performed some additional ad hoc SPT tests in 
November and December of 2005.  These consisted of the following:  A simulated docking position was 
selected at a range of approximately 1.3 meters.  Using the Newmark test equipment, the target was placed 
near the docking position (range of about 1.3 meters, all other parameters near zero).  Some error was 
deliberately allowed to remain, as a “simulated bias”.  The Leica was used to measure the truth location of 
the simulated docking position carefully.  Then several minutes of data were taken and treated as a 
simulated docking position with bias and noise errors.  This data was then analyzed to estimate the bias by 
eliminating the noise, and a procedure was developed to remove the bias.   
 
The procedure consisted of several steps.  First, the noise had to be separated from the bias.  By taking a 
sufficiently long sample, the noise could be largely removed via simple averaging.  It was only necessary to 
acquire a sufficiently long sample of data so that the sensor noise would fully manifest itself (that is, the 
data sample would contain 3-sigma max and min values as well as a representative sample of the overall 
noise pattern).  In the process of analyzing the data, we found that the noise characteristics of the AVGS 
fall into two frequency categories, which we call low-frequency and high-frequency noise.  The high 
frequency noise is fairly benign and follows an almost Gaussian distribution.  The high-frequency noise 
was around 2 Hz and had small amplitudes (on the order of 1/10 the 1-sigma requirement).  The sensor also 
had low-frequency noise (around 0.003 Hz) that was much more significant.  The low-frequency noise had 
a maximum amplitude of nearly one-half the 1-sigma requirement.  Thus low frequency noise is by far the 
dominant source of noise error, and in our ad hoc SPT tests we had to allow a sufficient amount of time for 
it to fully manifest.  We found that 5 minutes was necessary for the low frequency noise to be fully 
estimated and removed from a given data sample. 
 
Here we mention that one of the I-LOAD parameters is a matrix of Cartesian coordinates in of the AVGS 
corner-cube reflectors that is used in the Inverse Perspective algorithm in the AVGS flight software.  For 
the purposes of this discussion we need only to say that they are effectively the known locations of the 
corner cubes, and that they can be adjusted via I-LOAD.   We refer to this set of parameters as the “target 
matrix”. 
 
The original bias calibration procedure developed in January of 2006, based on the Systems Performance 
Test consisted of the following: 
 
1. Data was taken at a simulated docking position as described above. 
2. Simulated biases were estimated by removing the noise via simple averaging of the solution over a 
sufficient length of time. 
3. The “target matrix” of the AVGS target was translated in the flight software I-LOAD to remove 
Azimuth and Elevation simulated biases. 
4. The “target matrix” of the AVGS target was rotated with a rotation matrix consisting of the 
attitude biases as measured in step 2, and the flight software I-LOAD adjusted to the new corner 
cube positions. 
5. The new I-LOAD from steps 3 and 4 was tested with the flight software simulation using raw spot 
data from the original test and the residual bias checked against the specification. 
6. Steps 3 and 4 were repeated until the simulated bias was removed. 
 
We found that this bias calibration procedure worked very well, but that it required numerous iterations and 
that convergence was difficult to achieve.  The results of the accepted bias calibration are presented in 
Table 3 and Table 4.  Table 3 is the original uncorrected error and Table 4 is the residual bias error 
following the calibration procedure. 
 
Table 3) Original Errors at 1.3-meter SPT Test Position 
 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.001 0.03209 -0.19652 -0.28617 0.636735 -0.10338 
 
 
Table 4) Calibrated Errors at 1.3-meter SPT Test Position 
 
 
The successful development of a bias calibration procedure, allowed the AVGS to “pass” the Systems 
Performance Test and the sensor Systems Readiness Review in January of 2006 at the Boeing facility in 
Anaheim, CA. However, the procedure left something to be desired, as it required a large number of 
iterations and even when successful, and allowed fairly large bias errors to remain in the sensor solution 
(Table 4 is the best result and not representative of most). 
 
As the flight date approached, Boeing became concerned about the Calibration Procedure as the actual 
written procedure was ad hoc and not suitable for a flight project.   Furthermore, there were concerns on the 
part of the NASA AVGS team about the amount of time the procedure took to execute and the residual 
biases that it allowed.  Therefore, in March of 2006, at the request of Boeing, we attempted further 
improvements to the Bias Calibration Procedure in a week-long series of tests at the Flight Robotics 
Laboratory in Huntsville, AL.  The goal was to reduce the number of iterations, improve residual biases, 
and streamline the written procedure into one suitable for a flight project. 
 
After a full week of testing, we had great success with improving the accuracy and convergence time of the 
Bias Calibration Procedure.  After the lessons learned from the March testing were applied, it was rare that 
more than one iteration of the Bias Calibration Procedure was required.  Furthermore, the residual biases 
were reduced to the effective measurement precision of the sensor.  Another way of stating the last 
sentence is to say that, with the refined procedure, we can arbitrarily reduce the bias to zero in attitude for 
any given data sample, and to an acceptably low value in Azimuth and Elevation (with further iterations 
Azimuth and Elevation can effectively be zeroed as well, but typically this is not done).  Tables 5 and 6 
show the improved performance from a March 2006 test sample. 
 
 
Table 5) March Test Original Errors at 1.3-meter Range 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.000 0.008724 -0.00126 0.002233 0.003075 -0.00028 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.001 0.10485 -0.10313 -0.10492 0.080435 0.00000 
 
 
Table 6) March Test Calibrated Errors at 1.3-meter Range 
 
 
The improvement in performance indicated by Tables 5 and 6 was made possible by the following 
improvements in the Bias Calibration Procedure: 
 
1. The AVGS solution quaternion had to be re-normalized due to lack of precision in the output 
solution.  After normalization, the quaternion is then used to calculate the rotation matrix 
described in step 3 above.  (The quaternion is actually used in the Bias Calibration Procedure, the 
Euler angles in the table above were calculated for “human eye” convenience and so a direct 
comparison to the specification could be made.) 
2. The target matrix precision had to be expanded from 4 to 6 decimal places.  Although the I-LOAD 
target matrix in the AVGS flight software only has four decimal places, the target matrix is part of 
the rotational correction, meaning that it is multiplied with a direction cosine matrix calculated 
from the attitude bias error.  Thus the numerical error from lack of precision in the target matrix is 
amplified.   
3. In determining the bias from data samples, the median proved a much more accurate gauge of the 
true bias than the average.   
 
With these three improvements, the Bias Calibration Procedure was more than sufficient to support the OE 
flight.  We note that on item 3, it was originally thought that a filter might be necessary, but the low-
frequency noise characteristics of the AVGS were of such a nature that simply replacing the mean solution 
with the median worked well.  This is due to the signature of the low-frequency noise, which has a pattern 
that has a very repeatable amplitude but varies in frequency.  Using the median eliminates any “variable-
frequency” effect from this error source. 
 
The true test of the Bias Calibration Procedure occurred in October of 2006, when mated data from the 
vehicles in the clean room in Titusville, FL was obtained.  This data was used for a Bias Calibration 
Procedure including a new I-LOAD file for the flight sensor software in December of 2006, which was 
immediately followed by another test to validate that the procedure worked.  The test was performed by 
Boeing personnel remotely and the results sent to NASA for analysis.  At this point in time, we also worked 
with Boeing to develop the process of delivering an I-LOAD to them during the flight, if necessary.   
 
There was a concern that the bias would change from the bias measured (and then corrected) on the ground 
because the vehicles were launched mated together with a separation ring that was removed after launch.  
The removal (“blow-off”) of the separation ring was known at a minimum to cause a 2.5 mm difference in 
the AVGS “X” direction (the direction along the line of sight), but effects on attitude and bearing were 
unknown.  Therefore, since it was expected that the bias might actually change significantly between the 
ground and on-orbit operations, DARPA felt that if the bias calibration had to be repeated, it could wait till 
the vehicles were on-orbit and the separation ring removed.   
 
NASA and the Boeing AVGS lead managed to persuade DARPA that it was better to perform the Bias 
Calibration Procedure in December of 2006 for two reasons.  One, the initial biases on the sensor were very 
large, and it was possible that the on-orbit schedule might not allow an I-LOAD update.  Two, the Bias 
Calibration Procedure had never been tested with the real flight computers and hardware, and it was risky 
to wait until the spacecraft were on-orbit to attempt it for the first time.  DARPA eventually decided to 
allow the Bias Calibration Procedure in December 2006, in spite of an ambitious schedule to get the 
vehicles ready for flight.  One additional factor that was persuasive was the thought that if the bias 
calibration on the ground went well enough, we might not need it on orbit (a strong possibility in spite of 
the separation ring blow-off). 
 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.000 0.00401 -0.00229 -0.00004 0.00000 0.00000 
As stated previously, the initial biases from the October 2006 mated vehicle test were quite large, violating 
the AVGS specification.  Table 7 documents the bias from the original mated ground test sample.  A 
comparison of Table 7 to the AVGS specification in Table 1 reveals that the initial biases greatly exceeded 
specification.  For instance, the Pitch bias was - 0.54 deg compared to a specified accuracy of 0.2 deg.   
 
 
Table 7) Preflight Mated Biases 
 
The bias correction was tested in December of 2006 near the end of the time the mated stack was in the 
clean room in Titusville.  The results appear in Table 8.  As can be seen, the bias calibration correction was 
successful.  It only remained to see how well it would hold up in flight, after the separation ring was 
removed.  Note that the AVGS results in Table 7 display a 2.5 mm bias in Range.  This was deliberately 
introduced as part of the Bias Calibration Procedure to compensate for the presence of the separation ring 
during launch and early operations. 
 
Table 8) Preflight Corrected Mated Biases 
 
The correction held up very well, and the small differences were well within the internal tolerance 
established to decide if the Bias Calibration Procedure should be repeated, and were of course well within 
specification.  Also, the small differences in Table 8 are commensurate with the typical variability of the 
sensor due to low frequency noise, which can be corrected to an arbitrarily small value for a given sample 
of data, but will vary some small amount from sample to sample.  The next section goes into more detail on 
the low frequency noise and its implications for sensor accuracy. 
 
The final and most important test for the Bias Calibration Procedure was on-orbit.  Unfortunately, the 
sensor could not be tested prior to separation ring blow-off, because the separation ring included covers 
over all the proximity sensors.  However, after the separation ring was removed on April 17, 2007, the 
AVGS was able to actively track the NEXTSat as it was berthed (the NEXTSat was removed and replaced 
using a robotic arm on the ASTRO in order to remove the separation ring).  During this initial operation of 
the AVGS, no mated data was available.  However, on April 18, 2007, a calibration test was performed for 
all sensors.   During this test, the AVGS was able to obtain a sample of data.  The biases in the data appear 
in Table 9. 
 
Table 9) On-orbit Mated Biases 
 
Although larger than the biases on the ground with the separation ring intact, the biases in Table 9 are well 
below specification.  They did exceed the internal standard for the Bias Calibration Procedure.  That is, the 
results in Table 9 would require another iteration of the Bias Calibration Procedure.  However, the preflight 
agreement with DARPA and Boeing was that if the AVGS bias was within specification it would not be 
repeated on-orbit.  Therefore an in-flight Bias Calibration Procedure was not performed.  During nine 
additional mated data takes, the AVGS bias remained constant within +/- 0.05 deg in attitude and +/- 0.01 
deg in bearing.  No bias in Range was ever detected.  The slight variations in bearing and attitude were due 
to the low-frequency noise, with perhaps some variation in the docking mechanism as well.  The 
investment of time and energy before the flight in developing the Bias Calibration Procedure and effort 
expended in persuading DARPA to allow the procedure in the mated configuration in Titusville was well 
spent and paid great dividends on-orbit, as the AVGS was used for six unmated operations, including three 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.000 0.024637 -0.001719 -0.547150 0.298424 0.539984 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.0025 0.006 -0.008 0.006 0.000 0.010 
Range (m) Az (deg) El (deg) Pitch (deg) Yaw (deg) Roll (deg) 
0.000 -0.009 -0.024 0.028 -0.038 0.094 
dockings, two berthings and the final departure of the NEXTSat from ASTRO during End of Life (EOL) 
operations. 
 
LOW-FREQUENCY NOISE SIGNATURE  
 
The largest source of error that is not corrected in the AVGS is low-frequency noise error.  An example of 
the noise appears in Figure 4.  In Figure 4, pitch is plotted for a 30-minute segment of ground test data 
conducted under very quiescent conditions.  The data displays a strong periodic component with a duration 
of approximately five minutes.   
 
 
 
Figure 4) AVGS Pitch Behavior in Quiescent Ground Test 
 
 
 
Figure 5) AVGS Pitch Noise Correlation to Temperature 
 
Figure 5 is a plot of a temperature sensor vs. the same pitch data for the same time period.  In Figure 4, the 
right axis shows the scale for temperature in deg C, and the temperature is represented in the plot with 
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points.  The left vertical axis shows Pitch in deg and is represented by the line.  While the temperature data 
lacks resolution and is limited to just six values, it is still clear that the noise signature displays a strong 
correlation to temperature data.  The precise reason that the temperature and solution are correlated so 
tightly is unknown at this time.  It could be the effect of the temperature on the lens, the focal length of the 
imager, the imager itself, or some other factor.  The best theory to date is that the image chip is moving due 
to thermal stress in the pins that hold it in place. 
 
 
 
Figure 6) AVGS Solution-Temperature Correlation from Flight AC3 Test 
 
The behavior in Figures 4 and 5 was repeated on-orbit.  Figure 6 is a plot of the same two parameters for a 
long segment of mated data called the “AC3 Stress Test” (the AC3 is one of the ASTRO flight computers).   
Interestingly, the period in Figure 6 has changed to ~3 minutes from ~5 minutes in Figures 4 and 5.  The 
reason is that the space environment induced a different thermal reaction from the sensor.  The heaters were 
forced to turn on nearly twice as often on-orbit as they were at room temperature on the ground, thus nearly 
halving the period of the thermal cycle.  Since the Pitch also displayed the same change of frequency, the 
on-orbit results strongly re-enforce the correlation between temperature and solution low-frequency noise. 
 
In all three of Figures 4, 5, and 6, we can see that the variation in Pitch is roughly +/- 0.1 deg.  Since this 
variation is well within the one-sigma specification of 0.2 degrees, no corrective action is required.  
However, if greater accuracy were needed, several methods of mitigation could be considered.  If the 
problem is indeed caused by the mounting of the imager chip, then a structural change could fix the 
problem.  If the problem cannot be traced specifically to structural issues, then the thermal cycle of the 
sensor could be adjusted with different heaters to control to a narrower temperature range, provided that the 
mass or power penalty of such a solution is not severe.  If a hardware solution could not be found or was 
undesirable for some reason, it’s very likely that a software change incorporating temperature data could be 
used to adjust the solution and at least partially remove the low-frequency noise. 
 
Additionally in Figure 6 it can be seen that there is a phase shift when compared with Figure 5.  The phase 
shift sometimes occurs as a function of time for a single long-duration sample.  The most likely link 
between temperature and its effect on the solution is the pins holding the image chip bending under thermal 
stress.  If so, such an explanation would be consistent with the effect showing the same frequency 
dependence but shifting in phase from one sample to another.  While this is an attractive theory, at the 
current time the exact link between temperature and solution is not definitively known. 
 
Another aspect of Figure 6 that contrasts with Figure 5 is that the behavior of the Pitch is much less 
periodic.  This reflects the fact that the on-orbit environment was not as quiescent as the test data in Figures 
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4 and 5.  In fact, the ground test represented by those figures is notable for how quiescent it was.  Typically 
atmospheric turbulence and structural vibration play a role in adding environmental noise to a given AVGS 
data sample during any type of test.  However, the test in Figures 4 and 5 was performed around 4 AM 
local time with minimal disturbances from the environment, and the results reflect this.  Without this test, 
the phenomena of low-frequency noise would probably have escaped notice. 
 
In summary, although the AVGS is highly accurate and well within specification, if required the accuracy 
could be increased by removing or greatly reducing the largest remaining source of error. 
 
TARGET DESIGN LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Target design is also very important to the accuracy and reliability of a proximity sensor.  In the case of the 
Orbital Express AVGS, we learned many important lessons in this area.  Some of these lessons could be 
highly beneficial to future missions that use a proximity sensor that uses a target.   
 
A picture taken on-orbit of the SRT configuration is located in Figure 7, and the LRT configuration is in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 7) AVGS SRT Assembly on the NEXTSat during Separation Ring Blow-off 
 
 
 
Figure 8) AVGS LRT Assembly during Proximity Operations (arrows indicate corner cube 
locations) 
 
The traditional (classic) target configuration for the VGS and AVGS is to have three retro-reflectors in a 
row, equally spaced, with the middle retro-reflector offset on the side facing the chase vehicle (i.e., closer 
to the chase vehicle) in the docked position.  The top three spots of the SRT in Figure 7 are an example of 
this pattern. This target design allows easy pattern identification for everything but Roll (the rotation axis 
perpendicular to the plane containing the base of the target).  For Roll, another identifying feature must be 
used.  SRT spot #3 (see Figure 1) was used for “Roll discrimination” (the process of identifying Roll, 
which can be ambiguous in the presence of target symmetry).  In contrast, the OE LRT had no easy way to 
do Roll discrimination. 
 
From Figure 8, it can be seen that the LRT corner-cubes on the NEXTSat are arranged in almost a square 
pattern.  It is intuitively easy to see how this would cause problems for pattern recognition, as a square is 
symmetric, making pattern recognition and particularly Roll discrimination difficult.   
 
The difficulties with the LRT pattern recognition forced the AVGS team to incorporate the SRT into the 
LRT pattern recognition algorithm.  This solution worked, but also complicated the optical tuning of the 
sensor, as it was now necessary to view the SRT at all LRT operational ranges in order to acquire the 
pattern.  In addition, at sufficiently high tilt angles the SRT can merge with one of the nearer LRT spots.  
Certain tilt angles for which the SRT is merely near one of the two nearest LRT spots can also cause 
ambiguities.  These problems were eventually resolved, but added greatly to the complexity of the flight 
software. 
 
Based on the above and other considerations, we present the following guidelines for future target design to 
aid pattern recognition, enhance solution convergence, and improve accuracy: 
 
1. Have at least 3 spots and have a spot offset from the others in the direction of or away from the 
sensor along the sensor Line of Sight (LOS). 
2. The offset spot should ideally be located between the other two spots, so that when viewed from 
the sensor with no tilt angle or rotation, the three spots should appear to form a straight line. 
3. The amount the center spot is offset should be large enough that it will always have a range that is 
consistently either larger or smaller than that of the other two spots throughout the sensor 
operational envelope. (The offset spot should never have a range that is between the other two 
spots.) 
4. For Roll discrimination, a 4th spot is required. 
5. Symmetric arrangements of retro-reflectors such as squares or rectangles must be avoided. 
6. The ratio of the offset spot to the two other spots has certain values that are desirable for pattern 
recognition. 
 
In summary, target design is an important feature of sensor performance and should not be neglected.  Not 
only can accuracy suffer with a poor design, pattern recognition can be adversely affected as well, with 
unnecessary and costly complications to flight software.  It should also be noted that targets have been used 
with all visual proximity sensors that have achieved successful automated docking operations to date (the 
ATV ESA (European Space Agency) Videometer, the OE Boeing sensors and OE NASA AVGS).  Based 
on a broad and deep experience, accomplishing an automated docking using a visual proximity sensor 
without a target would be incredibly difficult. 
 
OTHER LESSONS LEARNED 
 
The scope of this paper is limited to lessons learned that directly affected the accuracy and calibration of 
the paper.  However, other lessons were learned in areas not directly related to calibration and validation 
that had an indirect effect on sensor accuracy.  Here we present only a brief overview of these.  More 
information is available in many cases from other sources. 
 
One of the biggest factors in sensor accuracy is the optics of the lens.  The lens designed for AVGS had 
optical defects that caused distortion of the image across the Field-of-View (FOV).  These effects had to be 
corrected via empirical software corrections to the raw spot locations from the imager.  This process is 
discussed in great detail in the paper by Howard, et al.  Although this issue did affect sensor accuracy, it 
was resolved by the time the Systems Performance Test took place, and so was not an issue to be discussed 
in this paper.   
 
Another issue that can affect sensor accuracy is also related to optics.  The determination of the effective 
focal length of the sensor plays an important role in mapping the raw pixel data from the imager into spot 
locations that can be processed by the flight software.  An incorrectly measured focal length can introduce 
errors that vary as a function of range into the solution.  The AVGS had some early issues with a poorly 
determined focal length, but again these were resolved prior to formal calibration. 
 
The AVGS uses the Texas Instruments (TI) TMS320VC33 card for the calculation of the solution.  This 
card was selected based on throughput for imager processing.  Unfortunately, due diligence was not 
completely performed and as it turned out the card was limited to single precision (32-bit) numbers.  
During the DART mission, this caused an error that grew with range to truncation issues with small angles 
between the spots.  Fortunately, the card also offers an “extended precision” (40-bit) number, and this was 
sufficient to fix the problem.  However, double precision numbers (64-bit) are still the preferred approach 
by a wide margin.  In addition to precision issues, the card also had its own math package for processing 
that was not as precise as the typical industry standard and was replaced by a shareware math package.   
 
Since the problem with the processor was solved as part of the DART project, it was not a primary focus of 
this paper, but is mentioned here to illustrate the law of unintended consequences.  A decision might be 
good for one aspect of the sensor design, but negatively impact another.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many valuable lessons have been learned from the validation and calibration of the AVGS sensor for 
Orbital Express.  One major lesson is to be careful to assess the impact of one part of the design on another.  
The issues experienced with target design and the selection of the processing card strongly illustrate this 
lesson.  For target design, some basic ground rules have been established to aid future design.  We also 
learned valuable lessons on the importance of optics to the accuracy of the sensor.  Future projects could 
benefit greatly from the optics lessons in particular.  We also gained insight into how the low-frequency 
AVGS noise behaves over time, as well as ideas on how to correct it.  While this lesson is more specific to 
AVGS, it could greatly enhance future performance of the AVGS if necessary, and could give other sensors 
ideas on how to process noise as well.  Overall, it should be stressed that a total systems approach for future 
vision-based proximity sensors should include optics, processor cards, target design, truth data 
determination, test design and rigorous data analysis. 
 
Many years of development of the AVGS culminated in a highly successful flight on the Orbital Express 
mission that, among other accomplishments, achieved the first American automated rendezvous and 
docking in space.  The insight gleaned from this experience provides essential guidance for future 
proximity sensors. 
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